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Since the end of the World War II, substantial additions have been
made to the stocks of tangible capital owned by consumers, busi-
nesses, and state and local governments.This paper is concerned
with the methods by which these additions to wealth have been
financed, the effect of the financing on the financial structures of
these groups, and, insofar as the data permit, some of the impli-
cationsof thefinancial developments for maintenance of high
rates of capital formation.
Patterns of financing have been extremely varied in this period.
They have differed with respect to the economic group doing the
financing and the type of capital formation being financed; in some
sectors of the economy, there have been sharp year-to-year changes
in patterns. The choice of financing methods is primarily a problem
of the economic entity or transactor rather than of the type of
transaction involved.Therefore major emphasis in this discussion
will be on the differences in patterns as among major groups of
transactors—consumers, corporations, and state and local govern-
ments—rather than among types of capital goods.
As in most quantitative investigations, available data are unsat-
isfactory in many respects. A brief review of the major statistical
problems may indicate the necessity for some of the analytic treat-
ments that follow.
First, inadequacies of the statistics pertaining to noncorporate
I • • . I • ousinessitnance precludes any discussion here.The discussion
of business financing of capital formation in this paper will be
restricted to the corporate sphere.
Note: The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and
not necessarily those of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System or of its Division of Research and Statistics.Much of the sta-
tistical material used was compiled in the course of a study of the private
debt structure undertaken by the staff working on the Flow of Funds accounts
inthe Division of Research and Statistics.The author is indebted to
his colleagues for use of the material and for their comments on early
drafts of this paper, but bears sole responsibility for errors of omission
or commission in the data or analysis.
tData on financing of farm capital expenditures are available; the farm
area has not been covered in this paper because of time limitations.
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Even for corporations, the analysis must be restricted largely to
long-term financing developments.Data on corporate short-term
borrowing by industrial groups are far less adequate, and industrial
differences appear to be among the most important factors ex-
plaining variations in corporate financing patterns.
In the consumer area, the principal problem is consistent defi-
nitionof the group to which available statistics pertain.For
longer-term comparisons of the aggregate statistics it is necessary
to use the concept of individuals or persons, a concept which in-
cludes, in addition to consumers, the activities of personal trusts,
unincorporated businesses, pension plans, and nonprofit organi-
zations.For shorter-term comparisons of the aggregates—covering
the period from 1939 to date—material is available which pertains
only to consumers and personal trusts, excluding the other sub-
components of the individuals' group.For distributive or cross-
sectional analysis, it is necessary to use yet another concept, that
employed inthe Survey of Consumer Finances of the Board of
Governorsof the Federal Reserve System.As defined in the
Survey, consumers include only natural persons; the assets and
debts of personal trusts and unincorporated enterprises are ex-
cluded (to the extent that Survey respondents can make this dis-
tinction).These differencesindefinition are reflected in the
statistics;thereforeitisdifficult to make direct comparisons
between the aggregates for individuals and those for consumers or
to compare either of the aggregates with the cross-sectional data.
In addition to problems concerning the coverage of transactors,
there are two major statistical difficulties in dealing with the data
on transactions:(1)the problem of relating specific financing
activities to specific types of capital formation, and (2) that of
obtaining estimates of gross rather than net financing.On the
first point heroic assumptions are frequently involved.Loans se-
cured by residential real estate must be considered as financing
residential construction, despite the knowledge (which unfortunately
cannot be quantified) that the proceeds of some of these loans are
used for other purposes.Similarly, proceeds of security issues for
plant and equipment financing must be assumed to be spent for
these purposes,althoughthe total amount of the issues so classified
may include some amount borrowed for working capital purposes.
IdentificatiQn of specific sources with specific uses of funds is
always hazardous.2
2Morris Mendelson has criticized the attempt in my paper to link spe-
cific financing and expenditures, particularly within short time intervals.
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On the second point, net versus gross financing, the problem is
one of availability of accurate data.Net borrowing (loans made
less repayments) statistics tend to understate the importance of
credit as a means of financing transactions. The gross data availa-
ble tend to overstate their importance.Thus while estimates of
gross new home mortgage loans are available for the period since
1925, only for recent years has any attempt been made to dis-
tinguish the borrowing for new home purchases from the loans
incurred to refinance existing debt or to purchase existing proper-
ties, both of which areincluded in gross borrowing. Fluctuations in
the refinancing component are apparentlywide that there is
little value in attempting to relate directly the total of gross new
loansto estimates of new capital formation in the residential
dwelling area.However, these refinancings appear both in the new
loans made and in the retirements; in the case of housing, therefore,
the use of the net figures (new borrowing less repayments) may be
preferable to the gross in relating financing and expenditures for
new capital.Difficulties such as these require the analyst to shift
from net to gross concepts from time to time, from sector to sector,
and from expenditure to expenditure categories, with ensuing diffi-
culties for the reader.
1. Financing Patterns
Consumers
Some historical perspective on consumer financing in the postwar
period is now afforded by the work done by Raymond W. Goldsmith
in the course of his study of individuals' saving in the United
States since The materials used here for the period up to
1933 come, for the most part, from his data. From 1933 to date, the
statistics cited come from the materials on saving compiled by the
Securities Exchange Commission and published annualiy by the
It is undoubtedly true that conditions in goods and services markets may
differfrom the state of financial markets, so that interim financing of
capital outlays may differ in form and amount from the permanent financ-
ing of suchprojects.This has occurred at certain times in the postwar
period in financing by utilities and, as is brought out at length subse-
quently in the paper, in a good deal of state and local financing.These
disparities,however, do not preclude analysis of the relationship be-
tween forms of financing and capital expenditures based on statements
by borrowers as to the ultimate or permanent source of the financing.It
merely requires caution in attempting to relate theaggregatestatistics
in precise time patterns.
3Raymond W. Goldsmith, A Study of Saving in the United States, Prince-
ton University Press, .1955.
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Department of Commerceinitsreconciliationof personal and
liquid savings.4 The SEC series have been linked to the Goldsmith
datawithappropriateadjustmentsforconceptualdifferences.
The long-term comparisons indicate that the ratio of consumer net
borrowing to purchases of homes and durable goods during the
postwar period was at record rates for this century (Table 1).In the
seven postwar years, net increases in home mortgages and consumer
credit averaged about a quarter of expenditures for homes and
durable goods, two and one-half times the average in immediate
prewar years, almost twice the ratio of net borrowing to expendi-
tures that prevailed in the early period of the 192O's, and about
three times the average financing ratio before War I.In the
postwar period the ratio of net increase in home mortgage debt
averaged over 60 per cent of one-to-four family homes constructed,
and the increase in consumer credit was about 12 per cent of con-
sumers' purchases of durable goods, as compared with 20 and 7 per
cent respectivelyinimmediate prewar years.The increasing
volume of debt repayments tended to reduce the ratio of net borrow-
ing to expenditures since the Korean somewhat below the
percentage in early postwar years,. but even the recent relationship
was substantially above pre-Worid War II experience.
Despite the high postwar proportionof financing to outlays,
individuals added to their equities in tangible assets at high rates.
Increases in net equities in homes and durable goods (purchases
less net borrowing and depreciation) averaged about 5 per cent of
disposable income in the postwar period, a proportion exceeded only
in the early 1920's.This high rate of additions to equities in a
period of extensive dependence on credit financing is attributable to
the relatively slow movement of depreciation charges.In periods of
rapid increase in prices and expenditures, depreciation charges—
which are computed against the entire stock of goods, including the
amounts bought at lower prices—do not keep pace with the rise in
expenditures.5The relatively small risein the volume of de-
preciation charges in such periods tends to offset the rapid rise in
4Table 6 in the July issues of Survey of Current Dept. of
Commerce.
'It should be emphasized that these estimates of depreciation are cal-
culated on an original cost basis, in keeping with the practice in national
income accounting and with the treatment of depreciation in the analysis
of corporate finances in a subsequent section of this paper.If deprecia-
tioa charges were calculated on a replacement cost basis, most—but
not all—of individuals' postwar saving in the form of tangible assets
would probably be eliminated (unless revaluations of assets were in-







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































zFINANCING OF CAPITAL FORMATION
borrowing; calculations of consumers' net additions to equities in
capital goods therefore showed large increases after both
Stars I and IL
Insofar as financing of capital formation is concerned, however, it
is difficult to conceive of individual consumers utilizing depreci-
ation reserves as sources of funds, for it is not likely that the
deprecktion charges impinge clearlyor systematically on the
behavior of most consumers.(Besides, those posessing assets and
theoretically accumulating depreciation reserves probably do not
account for much of the capital formation in any one period, at
least in the housing market.)A more important source of funds
for—or at least a stimulus to.—rising capital outlays is probably
the excess of current market value over original cost, or antici-
pation of this excess.
The data on consumer debt and expenditures cited above are but
rough guides to the relative importance of borrowing as a means of
financing such capital formation.It is possible to make some rough
adjustments in the short-term financing area in order to bring both
the gross borrowing and expenditure figures into better conceptual
alignment and more clearly measure the dependence on debt fi-
nancing.Charge account and service credit can be eliminated,
thereby limiting the consumer credit figures more closely to the
durable goods area.Estimates of finance and insurance charges
and renewal and duplicate financing can be eliminated from the
credit figures, and the expenditure figures can be adjusted to in-
clude purchases of used cars and individuals' purchases of passen-
ger cars for business use.
The adjusted statistics indicate a rapid rise in the proportion of
credit financing of consumers' durable goods in the postwar period
from about one-fifth of outlays just after the war to more than two-
fifths in 1952.The rise was particularly rapid after Regulation W
was suspended in May 1952; the average for 1952 was somewhat
above the estimated ratio of credit granted to expenditures in im-
mediate prewar years.
In 1953, dependence on credit abated somewhat; the ratio for the
first half of 1953 was below the proportion of credit use in the first
half of 1952, and the ratio remained relatively stable throughout
mOst of the second half of the year.This development, which may
signify an important shift inthe composition of the purchasing
population, must still be regarded with caution since the estimates
are based on preliminary figures for both credit extensions and
durable goods expenditures.
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The aggregate statistics may imply that the rising use of credit in
the postwar period was an optional choice of financing means, for
consumers as a whole, while borrowing for their purchases of
capital goods, added substantially to their stocks of financial
capital assets.in the seven-year period from the end of 1945
through 1952, consumers acquired $37 billion in currency and bank
deposits, United States government securities, and savings and
loan shares, and almost $49 billion inlife insurance reserves,
holdings of corporate and municipal bonds, and other financial
TABLE 2
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8Excludes estimated asset holdings of unincorporated businesses.
bincludescurrency and deposits, U.S. government securities, and savings
and loan association shares.
Cincludescorporate and municipalsecurities,creditunion shares,
mortgages,private insurance and pension reserves, and credit balances
with security brokers.
Source: Estimated from data compiled by Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, Department of the Treasury, and other sources.
claims. The average annual increase was almost three and one-half
times the rate of liquid assets accumulation in immediate prewar
years (see Table 2).The total acquisition of financial assets
since the war was half again as large as the growth in consumers'
debts.6
These aggregates, however, conceal disparate movements within
theconsumer sector,differences which are revealed in cross-
°These statistics refer to consumers and personal trusts only.They
exclude(oftenby rough estimation) the asset balances and debts of un-
incorporated businesses, nonprofit organizations, and pension and welfare
plans.Changes in holdings of securities represent purchases less sales;
unrealized capital gains are not included, nor are realized gains unless
the securities are sold outside the consumer sector.
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sectional data such as those provided by the Board's Survey of Con-
sumer Finances.7The available cross-sectional data specifically
relating to financial flows are not as detailed as those which relate
to stocks of assets and debts.It is possible, however, to use the
information on stocks to infer some of the characteristics of the
flows.
Differences in age and family status have apparently exerted
great influence on both the volume of expenditures and the way in
which expenditures were financed.For example spending units in
which the head of the family was under forty-five represented about
half of the population in 1951 accounted for almost 75 per cent
of all used car purchases, 70 per cent of home purchases, and 60
per cent of the purchases of new automobiles, furniture, and major
household appliances.Similar proportions obtainedinearlier
postwar years.
To finance these outlays, younger spending units both needed and
were willing to use credit.Younger units, particularly those with
children, tended to have smaller liquid asset balances and lower
liquid asset-to-income ratios than older units, particularly those
with no children.On the other hand, the Survey of Consumer
Finances indicates that throughout the postwar period the younger
units received income increases more frequently than older units,
and in the recession of 1949 suffered fewer income declines. A
more favorable income outlook, and the greater pressure of family
needs, encouraged younger units to spend for homes and durable
goods while a less favorable liquid asset position encouraged them
to borrow to buy.
7Friend suggests that conclusions drawn from the Survey of Consumer
Finances need to be qualified since "... theaggregate liquid assets
estimates obtained from the Survey of Consumer Fjnances are very much
lower than more reliable totals indicated by external data" (see comments
below, p.. 188).First I would suggest that the reliability of the external
data(presumablyhe refers to such aggregates as the SEC liquid asset
estimates) are opentosomequestion,at least with respect to level if
notchange.F'urther, as Friend is undoubtedly aware, theprocessof
comparingSurvey results with these aggregates involves bridging some
verygreat definitional gaps with shaky statistics.The establishment
of greater or lesser reliability is not a simple matter.
Evenif Survey aggregates were proven less reliable, this would not
invalidatecomparisons of characteristics as between different groups
in the Survey population, particularly where the differences are as strik-
ing as in the case of the financial resources of debtors and nondebtors.
Itis not the medians for the entire population which are relevant here
but rather comparison of medians for subsampies of the Survey sample.
To affect the analysis at all, it would have to be demonstrated that Survey
errorsaffect one group more than the other with respect to the asset,
debt, and income characteristics considered.
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This concentration of purchasers and credit users in the younger
age group is reflected in the current structure of consumer fi-
nanc.es.8Surveys taken early in 1953 indicated that 65 per cent of
the younger units—those where the head of the unit was under
forty-five——owed personal, i.e. non-real-estate, debts; oniy 38 per
cent of the older units owed such debts (Table 3).
TABLE 3
Characteristics of Consumers byPersonalDebtStatus,aEarly 1953
(percentagedistribution)
All Consumers
Consumers Cons urners With Without
PersonalPersonalWith Personal Without
Debts Debts Debts Personal Debts
All spending units 52 48 100 100
Income:
Under $3,000 44 56 30 49
61 39 38 28
$5,000 and over 56 44 32 23
Liquid assets:
Under $500 66 34 73 41
$500 or more 33 67 27 60
Ace:
Under 45 65 35 68 42
45 and over 38 62 32 58
Family status:
Married,children 73 27 58 23
Married, no children43 57 22 35
Unmarried 34 66 19 42
aExciudes real estate debt.
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 1953.
The pressure of family needs was also evident.Nearly three-
fourths of the married couples with children were in debt as con-
trasted with less than one-half of the married couples without
children.Finally, as noted above, younger consumers tended to
have small liquid asset reserves.Considering all age groups,
two-thirds of consumers with small liquid asset balances were in
debt as contrasted with only one-third of those with larger balances.
Major characteristics of the half of the population owing short-
term debts then may be summarized as follows: most debtors were
young, they had families, and had relatively small liquid asset
reserves.
Data on assets and debts refer to nonfarm, nonproprietor spending
units.
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Debtors couldfound in almost. every income group, but the
largest concentration was in the middle-income brackets—-$3,000
to $5,000 a year.Nearly two-fifths of the debtors were in this
group (only a third of the total population was in this bracket).
Consumers who were not in debt tended to have lower incomes.
Almost half of the debt-free consumers received less than $3,000 a
year and less than a third of the debt-free consumers were in the
middle-income group.
TABLE 4
















Per cent of all spending
units 100 38 10 34 18
Median income $3,420$2,780$4,730$3,450$4,590



















With children 40 19 58 49 65
Without children 27 32 23 18 24
Per cent not ascertained 9 10 7 11 7
alncludes real estate debt.
Source: SurveyofConsumer Finances, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 1953.
Of the consumers who. owed short-term debts, about a third were
also indebted for mortgages on their homes.These consumers
who bore the heaviest debt burden also tended to be younger and
had higher incomes and lower liquid asset reserves than the debt-
free.The median income of consumers owing both mortgages and
short-term debts was more than 60 per cent higher than the average
for consumers who were completely free of debt, but their liquid
asset holdings averaged 80 per cent less.About two-thirds of the
consumers obligated for both types of debt had children whereas
less than one-fifth of the debt-free group had such family responsi-
bilities (Table 4).
Survey information indicates the need for caution in interpreting
aggregate statistics on consumer saving and borrowing.Certainly
the cross-sectional data do not support an assumption that borrow-
ing was an optional means of financing purchases of capital goods—
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for most of the consumers buying, it was the only method short of
radical changes in current consumption outlays.
The fact that credit filled a need for consumers who wanted to
buy does not imply that the expansián of credit may not have ad-
verse social consequences. The availability of financing may have
carried expendituresfor homes, automobiles, andotherdurable
goods to unsustainable levels, compressing into a relatively short
time the upswing of normally cyclical expenditures. The rapid rise
tohigh rates of expenditures may have introduced serious dis-
tortions into the structure of production. recent rates of
consumer capital formation are sustainable in terms of existing
stocks and prospective requirementsisa question beyond the
purview of this paper.
Corporations
The postwar expansion in corporate fixed capital is impressive
even after the high price levels prevailing in this period are taken
into account.Average outlays for new plant and equipment in the
first seven postwar years amounted to $17.6 billion, three and one-
half times the rate in immediate prewar years and almost three
times the average for the 192O's.These outlays were both stimu-
lated and in large part financed by the high postwar rates of corpo-
rate profits and depreciation charges.Despite large tax and divi-
dend payments, the level of corporate profits was sufficiently high
to permit retained to average $19.6 billion, over three
times the rate just before the war and almost four times the average
from 1922 to 1929 (Table 5).
A large part of these earnings were plowed back into plant ex-
pansion programs, but the magnitude of the investment programs and
the increased need for inventories (and the relative distribution of
earningsand investment among individualcompanies) required
substantial external financing.Gross corporate security issues for
9Throughout this paper the term "retained earnings" is used for the
sum of retained profits plus depreciation charges.In arriving at this
sum, tax payments rather than tax liabilities have been deducted from
profitsbefore tax,since it is the current flow of tax payments that
affects the current availability of corporate funds.
One of the problems that has not been explored is whether the concept
of income after tax liabilities provides a more significant basis for rnoti-
vationalanalysis of the capital formation process.The definition of
retained earnings used here tends to fluctuate more widely than the com-
mon definition wherein tax liabilities are deducted, since tax payments
are made in any one year on the liabilities incurred for the previous year's
income.When incomes change rapidly, retained earnings after tax pay-





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2FINANCING OF CAPITAL FORMATION
plant and equipment financing averaged $4 billion a year in the
postwar period, or almost one-fourth of outlays for plant and equip-
ment—a much higher ratio than in the immediate prewar years.
Most ofthissecurityfinancing was throughdebt instruments;
on debt was, however, below what it was during most of the
The extent to which investment was externally financed varied
substantially among industries;'°further,within some industry
groupsthere werelargeyear-to-yeardifferencesin financing,
reflecting fluctuations in profits, taxes, dividend payments, de-
preciation charges, and capital outlays.
Industrial differences are most pointed in a contrast between
manufacturing industries and public utilities.Public utility profits
rose throughout the postwar period while manufacturing profits
fluctuated widely.Utilities paid out more in dividends, relative
totheir profits,but their depreciation charges were also much
greater relative to their incomes. On balance their retained funds—
retained earnings plus depreciation charges—were a much higher
proportionof profitsbefore taxes thanfor manufacturing (see
Table 6).Their expenditures for new plant equipment were also
higher relative to retained funds.For the postwar period as a
whole,fixedcapital expenditures by the public utilities were
two and three-fourthstimes retained earnings, whilefor manu-
facturing companies fixed capital outlays were one-sixth below
retained earnings (Table7). this large excess of capital
expenditures over internal funds,the utilities required external
financing toa much greater extent than other industrial groups.
Security issuesforplant and equipment financing amounted to
almost two-thirds of utility capital outlays since the war as com-
pared with one-eighth of manufacturing outlays for plant and equip-
ment.
The pattern of utility expenditures and financing appears to be
characteristic of regulated industries, whose revenues are usually
fixed with regard to the size of their capital base.The relation-
ships between income, expenditures, and financing for corporations
in the transportation and communication industries is similar, in
many respects, to the developments in the electric, gas, and water
group.The transportation and communication group also paid out a
'°Forthis analysis rough statements of sources and uses of funds
were constructed forfour major industry groups: manufacturing, public
utilities, transportation and communication, and trade.in some instances
it was necessary to approximate the industry distribution of certain items





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.FINANCING OF CAPITAL FORMATION
larger than average share of their profits in the form of dividends,
and also retained a larger than average share of profits through
charges to depreciation reserves.As in the case of the utilities,
these other regulated industries spent more for capital expansion
than their retained earnings would cover; external sources financed
about 30 per cent of their fixed capital outlays.'1
The trade groups—wholesale and retail—financed most of their
plant expansion internally.Security issues for plant and equipment
financing averaged only 4 per cent of such expenditures for the
postwar period.
The institutional factors affecting the financing patterns of regu-
lated industries do not permit as clear a picture of the year-to-year
interplay between availability of internal funds and the amount of
externalfinancing asisthecaseinmanufacturing industries.
Further, utility financing involves long-term capital for the most
part whereas manufacturing needs are complicated by changes in
inventories and tradecredit.It may be profitable, therefore, to
consider the postwar movements of incomes, outlays, and borrowing
for the manufacturing group more closely.
The course of manufacturing profits and expansion has been ir-
regular.Retained earnings increased sharply—almost doubled—
from 1946 to 1947 and stayed at these high levels in 1948. The
recession of 1949 resulted in a sharp drop in profits before taxes,
and an even sharper drop in retained earnings, since in 1949 these
corporations were paying taxes out of lower current incomes on the
higher incomes of the preceding year (Table 8).
Until the 1949 recession, manufacturing capital outlays •were at
high levels, with rising expenditures for new plant and equipment
offsetting declining rates of inventory accumulation.in 1949, with
"Friend objects to this grouping of transportation and communication
companies on the ground that significant differences between telephone
and railroad financing are obscured.His criticism is well taken, at least
with respect to differences in dividends paid.En the postwar period as a
whole,the transportation group paid out in dividends about the same
proportion of profits before taxes as did manufacturing industries, and
less than half the proportion for electric, water, and gas utilities or com-
munication companies.However, in other respects the groupings may
not be as inappropriate as Friend indicates.Depreciation charges rela-
tiveto income were much higher for communication, transportation, and
utilities than for manufacturing industries.Their retained earnings and
charges were also higher, and expenditures for capital outlays ex-
ceeded retained earnings and charges by substantial margins for all three
of the "regulated" groups as compared with an excess of earnings over
expendituresfor the manufacturing group.It is this contrast the text
intended to emphasize.
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TABLE 8
Sources and Uses of Corporate Funds, Manufacturing, 1946—1952
(billions of dollars)
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952
Operating receipts:
Profitsbefore tax8 12.117.419.015.0 23.8 26.422.3
Plus:Depreciation charges 1.9 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.43.8 4.7
Less:
Profits tax payments 6.3 4.9 6.7 7.25.9 10.614.9
Netdividend payments and otherb 1.52.83.03.44.24.1 4.0
Equals:Retained earnings and charges6.212.].12.17.617.115.58.1
Capital outlays:
Plant andequipmentexpenditures 6.58.48.86.97.210.511.6
Other capital expenditures 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Inventory change 6.34.32.72.64.98.60.?
Totalcapital outlays 12.812.711.5 4.312.119.112.3
Financing:
Grosssecurity issues 3.12.22.21.41.23.13.9
Issues for plant and equipment 1.00.80.80.50,31.82.2
Issues for working capital 0.80.71.00.30.40.81.2
Debtissuesas per cent of total (%) (55)(64)(81)(86)(73)(74)(84)
Net new issues 2.21.81.90.80.22.33.2
Long-term loanac
Notes and accounts payable, net of
receivables 1.0 —0.6 —0,4 —1.0 —1.02,9 —0.3
Short-term bank debt, netC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Short-term trade debt, netc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total loaxie,.net 1.0 —0.6 —0.4 —1.0 —1.02.9 —0.3
Liquidassets:
Increasein cash and U.S. government
securIties 4.20.60.33.03.81.7 —0.1
aNational income concept (among other adjustments to Bureau of Internal Rev-
enue data, it excludes capital gains and losses) except that profits subsequently
eliminated through renegotiation of war contracts have not been deducted.
bincludes net dividends paid (dividends paid less dividends received) plus
payments to government as a result of contract renegotiations (in the year when
paid) lass tax refunds and insurance benefits.
CNo Industry allocations available,
retained earnings sharply lower, capital outlays declined by an even
greater amount.New plant expenditures dropped $2 billion below
the 1948 rate, and the reversal in 'the inventory situation—from net
accumulation to net decumulation—represented a $5 billion drop in
uses of funds.The decline in total capital expenditures (inven-
tory, and plant and equipment) was greater than the reduction in
internal funds available for such purposes; as a result the excess
of retained earnings over capital outlays increased substantially.
Profits picked up sharply after the Korean War began and although
manufacturers added substantially to their inventories, it was some
time before defense plant expansion really got underway.For the
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year 1950 as a whole, the excess of retained earnings over capital
outlays was substantially larger than in the preceding year.
Profits continued to increase in 1951, but the sharp rise in tax
payments and the maintenance of dividend payments despite the
pressure on corporate funds reduced retained earnings about 10 per
cent below the rate in 1950.Plant expansion programs (largely
associated with the defense program) increased by almost 50 per
cent, and inventory accumulation continued at close to the high
rates of the half-year after the outbreak of hostilities.
retained earnings had exceeded capital outlays by $5 billion in.
1950. they were $3.6 billion less than outlays in 1951.
The tight financial position continued in 1952, though for quite
different reasons.Profits before taxes dropped by a sixth; higher
tax payments and continued high dividend payments reduced re-
tained earnings by almost one-half.Although the decline in earn-
ings was offset by a sharp reduction in the rate of inventory ac-
cumulation, plant expansion continued at an increased pace; capital-
uses exceeded internal funds by over $4 billion.
Fluctuations in the funds available to manufacturing corporations
from operations and in capital outlays were reflected in changes in
external financing.As the excess of retained earnings over total
capitaloutlays(including inventories)diminished,externalfi-
nancing of plant and equipment expenditures increased both abso-
lutely and relative to expenditures.Security issues for financing of
plant and equipment expenditures had averaged less than 10 per
cent of investment in the postwar period through 1950; in 1951 the
ratio rose to 17 per cent and in 1952 to 19 per cent of expenditures,
or almost twice the pre-Korean-%Var rate.(Table 7).
Despite this risein the proportion of external financing, the
absolute amount of investment to be financed out of internal funds
increased.The volume of plant and equipment expenditures over
and above that financed by plant and equipment security issues
averaged about $7 billion up to the Korean %Var.In the next two
and one-half years the average was close to $9 billion.
The drain on internal funds to finance short-term needs also
increased after the Korean War began.In the first four and one-
half postwar years, corporate inventory accumulation did not result
in much of an increase in net short-term liabilities.Over this
period, manufacturers added $11 billion to their inventories; while
security issues for working capital purposes totaled about $3 bil-
lion,this was offset bya comparable decline in net payables
(payables less receivables).
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After the outbreak of hostilities, inventories rose sharply and the
proportion of external financing of these short-term requirements in-
creased.Notes and accounts payable and working capital issues
accounted for about one-fourth of the inventory accumulation in the
last half of 1950 and about 40 per cent of the inventory rise in 1951.
As in the case of long-term needs, however, the percentage rise in
financing left a large absolute amount to be financed from internal
funds.The excess of inventory accumulation over working capital
issues and net payables was close to $5 billion, or twice the pre-
average.in 1952 inventory accumulation was small, and
although corporate receivables increased, the rise in payables and
in security issues for working capital purposes offset theincrease
in short term needs.The pressure for external financing in 1952
was largely a reflection of the decline in incomes and the continued
growth in plant expansion programs.
These year-to-year changes in financing patterns indicate (if all
manufacturing companies can be treated as homogeneous with re-
spect to these problems) the need for considering the whole state-
ment of sources and uses of funds in projecting the nature and
extend of demands for financing.The volume of expected outlays
for either fixed of working capital alone is not an adequate basis
for understanding the force of demands on capital markets or the
banking system.
Available information that distinguishes financing patterns by
size of company is extremely limited.Federal Trade Commission
reports on manufacturing company finances are available only for
recent years, and those for trade industries for an even shorter
period.
One comparison that can be made for the whole postwar period to
date is between the financing patterns for very large corporations
and the average for all corporations in each major industry group.'2
The comparison indicates that large manufacturing and trade com-
panies depend on external financing for capital expansion to about
the same extent as the average for all corporations in each of these
industry groups.The average for both large and other corporations
and manufacturing and trade was, substantially less than the ratio
of external financing to capital outlays for large or other public
large corporation data refer to the materials on ex-
penditures, and security issues of three hundred large corporations for
whichthe research staff of the Board of Governors regularly compile
financial data from published sources.The averages for all corporations
come from the data compiled by the SEC and the Dept. of Commerce.
166FINANCING OF CAPITAL FORMATION
utilities.'3 This information is not conclusive, of course, as to the
influence of size of company on methods of financing capital for-
mation, for a much more detailed classification by size, capacity
situation, etc. is necessary.It is interesting, however, to note that
the contrast between the utilities and the other industry groups
holds both for the very large corporations and the average for all
companies.
Given the extent of external financing of long-term needs, the
form of such financing did not vary much among industries.'4For
all corporations combined, debt issues accounted for the bulk of
security flotations (excluding investment company issues) in the
postwar period—almost three-fourths of the total from 1946 through
1952.This was about the same proportion as in most of the 1920's
(except for 1928 and 1929, when stock issues predominated) and
less than the ratio of debt issues to total flotations during the
1930's and the war period (Table 9).
Utilities and other regulated industries tended to rely on debt
issues in their postwar financing to a greater extent than manufac-
turing and trade; on the other hand, more of their debt issues were
convertible into stock than was true for other groups. The miscel-
laneousindustrialgroup used equity issuesfor most security
flotations, but their issues accounted for less than 12 per cent of
all corporate issues in the postwar period.
Dependence on debt for external financing reflected both lender
and borrower preferences.High tax rates encouraged debt rather
than equity issues, as deduction of interest charges in computing
income taxes reduced effective interest cost.For companies in the
excess profits tax bracket, the full interest cost might be sub-
stantially offset by tax saving.
'3The comparisons here are between net security issues (gross issues
less repayments) rather than gross issues and expenditures.The gross
datawhich wereused in previous parts of this paper are not available
for the 300-company sample.
l4With reference to Friend's question concerning industrial variation
inthe proportion of debtissuestototal security flotations, the ratios






Transportation and communication 77
Communication 61
Transportation 98
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TABLE 9
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191981.182.6 42 193684.0$ 4.5 89
19201.7 2.8 61 19371.7 2.3 74
19212.0 2.3 82 19382.1 2.1 100
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19312.0 2.4 83 19485.9 7.3 81
















19352.3 2.3 100 19527.4 10.0 74
Source: From 1919—1933, from Commercial and Financial Chronicle,
appropriate years, except that investment trust issues have been excluded.
From 1934 on, from unpublished Securities and Exchange Commission
data.Differs from published SEC series on new security issues sold for
cash by numerous adjustments, e.g. inclusion here of securities sold to
employees, private sales to foreigners, etc. Includes issues for refunding,
other debt retirement and exchanges. Sales of investment company issues
are excluded.
Also important was the large volume of funds available for invest-
ment in the form of debt.Individuals' saving through financial
institutions,such as insurance companies, pension plans, and
mutual savings banks, was at record rates and these institutions,
which are primarily suppliers of credit rather than equity funds,
major sources of the external financing of corporate plant
expansion.Over half of all corporate bond issues in the postwar
period were placed through direct negotations with institutional
lenders (Table ]0).
Almost all of the private placements were debt issues, and the
largest share was received by manufacturing companies.Although
manufacturing accounted for only a third of all corporate securities
floated in the postwar period, they received about half of all private
placements.
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Regulations requiring competitive bidding precluded the use of
private placements by most utility holding companies; as a result,
security financing by the utility group was for the most part (three-
fourths of their total issues) through market offerings.
TABLE 10
Private Placement of Corporate Securities, 1934—1952
(dollars in billions)
Percentage Ratio,
Total Total Private Placements
Private Debt to Total Debt
Year Placements issues issues
1934 30.1 30.4 25
1935 0.1 2.3 17
1936 0.4 4.0 10
1937 0.3 1.7 18
1938 0.7 2.1 33
1939 0.7 1.9 37
1940 0.8 2.5 32
1941 0.8 2.4 33
1942 0.4 0.9 44
1943 0.4 1.0 40
1944 0.8 2.7 30
1945 1.0 4.9 20
1946 1.9 4.7 40
1947 2.1 5.0 42
1948 3.0 5.9 51
1949 2.5 4.9 51
1950 2.7 4.8 56
1951 3.4 5.7 60
1952 4.0 7.4 54
Source: Securities and Exchange Commission.
External financing of short-term needs has of course been largely
. 15 throughdebt—bank loans, trade credit, and working capital issues.
Of the $38 billion increase in corporate notes and accounts payable
from year-end 1945 to year-end 1952, almost $10 billion, or more
than one-fourth of the total, represented increased short-term debt
owed to banks.In addition to this short-term borrowing, working
capital security issues supplied $9 billion of funds for short-term
requirements.'6The data on short-term bank debt by industrial
"No breakdown of working capital issues by type of security is avail-
able.It is presumed that most of these were debt instruments.Most of
the issues were by manufacturing companies.
'6This is the gross amount of such issues; data on securities retire-
ments by type of issue are not available.
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group arenotavailable for most of the postwar period; presumably
the bulk of these loans were obtained by manufacturing and trade
companies.
in the consumer area, demographic characteristics such as age
and family status were important in determing the means used to fi-
nance consumer capital formation.In the corporate area, industrial
differences may be the significant factors affecting the extent and
form of external financing, but their importance may be overstated
because this is the only basis of classification within the corporate
sector.More adequate information on financing and investment by
size of company and on balance sheet structures (particularly on
liquidity and net worth positions) might prove these factors to be
more significant than industrial differences, but they cannot be
isolated in the aggregate information available.
State and Local Governments
The financing of capital formation by state and local governments
is included in this discussion largely as an illustration of the
difficulty of relating capital expenditures to financing on any close
timing basis.while these governmental units spent large sums for
various types of community facilities in the postwar period, their
expenditures were not as large as might be expected from the
amount of external financing they obtained.As a result these
governments(intheaggregate) accumulated substantialliquid
asset balances.Because of differences in the nature of capital
outlays and in the availability of sources of financing, local govern-
ments are considered separately from state governments.
Most local debt has been incurred to finance capital expenditures
for schools, streets, water and sewage systems, and other com-
munity facilities.Such outlays increased from a rate of Si billion
in 1946 to $4.3 billion in 1952. The revenues of local governments
also increased rapidly over this period, as rising retail sales and
property values enlarged the tax bases these governments cus-
tomarily depended on for their tax revenues.The increase in
revenues was offset partially by rising operating expenditures, as
increased payrolls and material costs boosted outlays on current
account.Net revenues—gross receipts less current operating ex-
penditures—increased only 50 per cent in the postwar period as
compared with the 330 percent rise in capital outlays (Table 11).
The large volume of outlays which could not be covered out of
revenues required extensive borrowing by local governments.In
the seven years from the end of 1945 through 1952, local govern-
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TABLE 11
State and Local Governments:
Net Revenues, Capital Outlays, Long-Term Security Issues, 1946—1952
(dollars in billions)
1946194719481949195019511952




Equals: Net revenues 3.93.94.14.04,76.56.8
Capital outlays 1.72.94.25,56.16.8 7.1
Long-term security
issues 1.01.72.12.52.73.2 4.1
Security issues as per





Equals: Net revenues 2.02.01.9 1.42.03.33.8
Capital outlays 0.71.21.62.02.42.62.8
Long-term security
issues 0,10.20.30.40.7 1.1 1.2
Security issues as per





Equals: Net revenues 1.9 1.92.22.62.73.23.0
Capital outlays 1.01.72.63.53.74.24.3
Long-term security
issues 0.9 1.5 1.82.12.02.1 2.9
Security issues as per
cent of capital outlays (91.2) (87.8) (70.9) (61.4) (53.8) (48.4) (67.4)
Note: "Gross revenues" include taxes, intergovernmental revenue, pen-
sion assessments, unemployment taxes, earnings on property and invest-
ments, receipts from sales of goods and services by government enterprises,
and miscellaneous receipts such as fees and donations.Receipts from
issue of debt or liquidation of investments are excluded.Series is esti-
mated by adjusting total Department of Commerce state and local receipts
to include interest income and receipts from sales of government enter-
prises, state employment taxes, and state workmen's compensation as-
sessments, and to exclude employer (government) contributions to retirement
and cash sickness funds;Aid received by states from local units and
vice versa are added to federal grants-in-aid.Adjustments not available
from Department of Commerce are estimated from Bureau of the Census data.
"Current expenditures" are gross expenditures less capital outlays.
Gross expenditures include expenses for current operations of governments
Notes continued on next page
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Notes to Table 11 (continued)
and their enterprises; capital outlays, including purchases of land, equip-
ment, and existing structures; unemployment insurance, workmen's com-
pensation and retirement benefits. Expenditures for retirement of debt and
for investments are excluded.Adjustments are made to Department of
Commerce series for total state and local expenditures for grossing of
interest and current surplus of enterprises and for the inclusion of pur-
chases of land, existing structures, unemployment compensation benefits,
and aid paid by states to local units and vice versa.Adjustments not
available from Department of Commerce are estimated from Bureau of the
Census data.
"Long-term security issues" are from Bond Buyer.Series excludes is-
sues for refunding, bonus, and other issues, of minor importance in recent
years not related to capital outlays.
Data for local governments were obtained as residual by deducting state
series from total.Securities issued by special authorities have been as-
signed to the appropriate governmental level on the basis of the nature of
the sponsoring government.
ments issued over $13 billion of long-term security issues; these
financed almost two-thirds of the capital programs undertaken by
municipalities and other local governments in this period.
There was not, however, very close year-to-year coincidence of
financing and expenditures.While the rise in capital outlays was
much sharper than the increase in net revenues, long-term security
issues declined as a percentage of these expenditures from 1946
through 1951.
The peculiar behavior of the financing-to-expenditure ratio is the
result of several factors.Throughout the period there was appar-
entlysubstantialfinancinginadvance ofactualconstruction
expenditures, or even in advance of the granting of awards for
construction.Security issues were often for the entire amounts of
proposed projects, while expenditures out of the proceeds of the
issues were spread over several accounting periods.Itis not
possible to determine the actual lag between financing and ex-
penditures on each of the many individual projects undertaken by
local governments, but it is possible to make certain comparisons
at the aggregate level which infer a substantial time differential.
For example, in 1,952 the volume of contracts awarded for school
construction was about the same as in the previous year, whereas
long-term issues sold to finance school building were more than
twice the amount floated in 1951.
Inferential evidence of extensive anticipatory financing is the
rise in local government liquid asset holdings.Cash and security
holdings increased about 70 per cent since 1945, almost keeping
pace with the rise in local debt. Of course this is an aggregate for
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all local governments combined, and the liquid asset holdings may
be distributed differently from the distribution of debt.
Another factor which obscured the relation between expenditures
and 'financing at the aggregate level was the method of financing
housing projects subsidized under the housing act.Actual con-
struction of these low-rental housing projects was financed through
temporary short-term loans; customarily the permanent long-term
financing was not undertaken until the construction was almost
completed.Changes in the relative importance of such housing
construction in the total of local government outlays could change
the ratio of security issues to expenditures.
Finally the existence of controls on financing in part of the
period must be taken into account.Under the voluntary credit-
restraint program which was in existence from March 1951 to May
1952, proposed security issues by state and local governments were
screened to minimize financing of construction activity which might
have interfered with the flow of materials for the post_Korean_ST/ar
defense program.In1951, during most of which the Voluntary
Credit Restraint program was in effect, local government contract
awards for construction amounted to $3.2 billion, an increase of 15
per cent over the 1950 total, but the volume of long-term security
issues was about the same in both years.
In 1952 local government contract awards remained at about 1951
rates, but the voiwne of security issues increased almost 40 per
cent.In the first half of 1953 the financing volume continued to
rise, while the expenditure rate remained at about the 1952 rate.
For most of the postwar period, state net revenues exceeded
capital outlays; dependence on external financing was much less for
states than for local governments.For the 1946-1952 period as a
whole, long-term securities issued by state governments provided
funds for only 30 per cent of their capital outlays as compared with
63 per cent for local government units.'7
As in the case of local governments, some postwar state fi-
nancing was undertaken well before actual expenditures.For
example over $700 million of bonds for toll facilities (turnpikes,
bridges, and other such projects) were sold in 1952 for which work
just got underway in 1953.Partly as a result of this anticipatory
'7While states borrowed proportionately less of the funds needed for
capital expansion than did municipalities, state borrowing for refunding
debt,veterans' bonuses, and other nonconstruction purposes was very
large, accounting for almost two-fifths of the securities they floated in
the postwar period.
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financing, state liquid asset holdings increased as substantially as
have those of local governments since the end of the Korean
2.Changes in Financial Relationships
The large volume of external financing of capital formation in the
postwar period has resulted insubstantial changes in balance
sheet structures and in the proportion of incomes claimed by fixed
chargesforservicing debt—bothfactorswhich can influence
futurerates of capital formation.The extent of changes in li-
quidity,net worth, and fixed claims on incomes is sufficient to
warrant some analysis, even though the data available on these
changes are not adequate to provide explicit behavior relationships.
The changes, and the quality of data describing them, differ from
sector to sector; therefore discussion of these problems is organ-
ized as heretofore in terms of the major economic groups: consumers,
corporations, and state and local governments.
Consumers
Consumers' borrowing in the postwar period boosted their ag-
gregate debt from $29 billion at the end of 1945 to $86 billion at the
end of 1952.As noted earlier, the increase in debt was more than
offset by consumers' acquisition of all types of financial assets
during this period.However, the postwar structure of additions to
financial assets was substantially different from prewar patterns.
Liquid assets, defined here as currency and deposits, United States
government securities and savings and loan shares," accounted
for about 70 per cent of additions to financial asset balances in
1939 and 1940.During fl, pressure to buy savings bonds
and the small volume of new issues of other securities boosted the
liquid component of the total to about seven-eighths. On the other
hand, since the war less than half of all financial asset accumula-
tion has been in these liquid categories.Therefore the sharp de-
clines in conventional liquidity measures, such as ratios of debt to
liquid assets or to income, from the high peaks at the end of the
war do not reflect the large postwar volume of financial saving.
Estimates of the aggregate value of assets which many consumers
may consider as part of their liquid reserves—cash values of
insurance policies,"blue chip" stocks or bonds, or even some
minimum value attributed to equities in homes, or other
durable goods—are too poor to permit analysis.Considering the
scale of liquidity is too continuous to permit of any but an ar-
bitrary distinction between liquid and other financial assets.
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postwar growth in consumer holdings of such assets, their inclusion
wouldundoubtedlytemperthedecline showninconventional
liquidity ratios.
Even if adequately measured, the significance of these liquidity
changes on capital formation is suspect.Survey data for recent
years indicate that intentions to purchase capital goods are highest
in the groups already carrying the largest volume of debt and with
the lowest liquidity positions.
Given the availability of credit, the aggregate volume of consumer
capital expenditures would thus appear to depend more on the age
and family composition of the group than on aggregate liquidity
ratios.More specifically it is probably dependent on the current
income, and the income and price expectations of the younger mar-
ried families with children.Of course there are minimum levels at
which consumers desire to maintain their liquid reserves or liquidity
ratios or at which they would be required to maintain them to obtain
credit, but these standards do not appear to have been very re-
strictive on those consumers with the greatest propensities to
purchase capital goods.
Consumers' flexibility rather than liquidity may be a more impor-
tant influence on their future expenditure rates.The large volume
of debt consumers have incurred—and the increased popularity of
certain forms of saving—have increased the proportion of incomes
tied up in contractual payments for debt service, insurance, and
other relatively fixed charges.19Rough estimates of debt service
payments indicate that scheduled amortization and interest charges
took about 13 per cent of disposable income in 1952, more than
twice the proportion in 1946, and about a fifth more than before
Var II.One factor underlying the rise in debt service was the
rapid increase in home ownership, which substituted mortgage and
1Again some comments on methodology are necessary.Required re-
payments of debt are difficult to distinguish from prepayments or from
debtliquidationsassociated with sale of the collateral assets.These
factors are more important in mortgage debt repayments than in consumer
credit.Rough estimates of required mortgage amortization have been
made by the author and colleagues by adjusting the gross retirements of
mortgage debt on the basis of assumptions about the terms of the debt
outstanding at the beginning of each postwar year.No adjustments have
been made to the consumer credit figures.The interest components of
debt service charges are those used in the national income accounts.
Since estimates for even recent years entail very crude techniques, it
was impossible to extend the analysis of debt burden back to the 1920's,
asFriend suggests would be desirable.Most analyses of this period
haverelied on interest charges alone as a comparative measure of the
debt burden.
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other payments for rent payments.AnQther factor has been more
widespread regular debt amortization—most of the mortgages now
outstanding require regular monthly repayment of principal (Table
12).
Although effective interest rates (interest payments as a per-
centage of debt outstanding) are well below prewar levels—cur-
rently they are estimated at 4.5 per cent as compared with 6 per
cent in 1939—the interest component of total mortgage debt serv-
ice is high. This is probably attributable to the fact that most home
mortgages outstanding are relatively young and have been written
for relatively long maturities; in the early periods of such debts,
most of the scheduled payments are for interest rather than reduc-
tion of principal.
The effective interest rate on consumer short-term debts is now
higher than before the war, partially reflecting the shift in com-
position of short-term liabilities.Security and policy loans, which
generally carry relatively low interest rates, are now a much smaller
proportion of the total; most of the short-term debt is now in rela-
Lively expensive installment sales credit.
Contractual payments for amortization and interest are not the
only fixed claims against consumer income.Contractual obli-
gationsfor rent, insurance, and property taxes on homes2' also
reduce consumers' flexibility in the use of current income.The
total of all of these charges, including debt service, increased
rapidly in the postwar period.21The rise was modified by the
continued existence of rent controls, but total fixed charges have
increased from 15 per cent of disposable income in 1946 to 23 per
cent in 1952.The current ratio is almost as large as in 1939.
These aggregates lump together the incomes of debtors and
nondebtors and thereby understate the importance of debt service
charges for the groups which have accounted for most of consumers'
postwar capital formation.Distributive data on debt service are
not available.Some information on contractual payments in 1948
was collected in the Board's Survey of Consumer Finances in
20 Not included in personal taxes in the calculation of disposable in-
come by the Dept. of Commerce.
211n this calculation, premiums on insurance in force at the beginning
of the year—life and nonlife—have been included as contractual obliga-
tions.This may be an overstatement of the volume of fixed claims on
incomes since policyholders are usually free to allow the insurance to
lapse.Ilowever, such premium payments are usually "sticky" with re-
spect to income fluctuations; furthermore, some of them, such as auto-
mobileor home insurance premiums, may have to be maintained under
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1949, but since then aggregate debt has increased substantially
faster than aggregate incomes, and the distributions may have
changed.
One analysis made of these earlier Survey data22 concluded that
consumers could devote a maximum of 13 to 15 per cent of dis-
posable income for repayment of installment debts.However, such
conclusions required rather specialized assumptions about spending
and price patterns.Any particular debt service ceiling may be
inappropriate if changes in patterns of spending for current con-
sumption or differences in relative price changes free more funds
for carrying a larger volume of debt.Such changes, or easing of
credit terms, could sustain a larger volume of capital expend-
itures with a given volume of income.The debt service criterion
may be more significant than the liquidity ratio, but it is not subject
to too rigid application.
Corporations
Dependence on debt as a means of financing capital outlays ex-
ternally has resulted in substantial changes in corporate balance
sheets.Debt is now about 43.5 per cent of assets, an increase of
5 per cent since 1945.23. The relationship in 1952 of debt to assets
(used here in preference to the more volatile debt-to-net-worth ratio)
is the highest for the twenty-three-year period examined (Table 13).
Short-term debts other than tax liabilities have contributed most
to the postwar rise in the total debt-to-asset ratio.Of the 5 per
cent increase in the ratio since 1945, long-term liabilities con-
tributed 1 per cent, the rise in tax liabilities 1 per cent, and the
remaining 3 per cent was the result of the sharp rise in short-term
bank and trade debts.
Changes in the debt-to-asset ratio for all corporations tends to
conceal widely divergent movements among the major components of
2244MoreCredit for Consumer Spending," Business Record, National
Industrial Conference Board, March 1953.
23Data on assets and debts are difficult to obtain or to use.Tabula-
tionsof balance sheets filed with tax returns suffer from definitional
incomparabilities over time.Changes in the degree of consolidation of
corporation reports, changes in the definitions of particular items in the
balance sheets, and changes in industrial classification and in the ex-
tent of consolidation affect principally the utilities and the transportation
and communication group; most of thebalancesheet analysis will there-
fore be restricted to the manufacturing industry group, for which the data
are more consistent over time.Statistics of In come balance sheet data
for this group are available only through 1949; for subsequent years the
movements have been estimated from a variety of sample data.
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TABLE 13




1926 0.41 0.29 0.54 0.43
1927 0.40 0.27 0.51 0.42
1928 0.39 0.25 0.50 0.42
1929 0.38 0.25 0.50 0.38
1930 0.37 0.25 0.49 0.40
1931 0.39 0.25 0.49 0.41
1932 0.40 0.26 0.50 0.41
1933 0.40 0.25 0.51 0.43
1934 0.40 0.27 0.51 0.40
1935 0.41 0.29 0.51 0.40
1936 0.41 0.29 0.52 0.41
1937 0.39 0.26 0.50 0.39
1938 0.39 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.40
1939 0.39 0.25 0.49 0.51 0.40
1940 0.40 0.27 0.48 0.53 0.40
1941 0.41 0.31 0.48 0.54 0.42
1942 0.42 0.35 0.48 0.51 0.44
1943 0.42 0.36 0.48 0.51 0.42
1944 0.41 0.34 0.47 0.48 0.43
1945 0.38 0.30 0.46 0.46 0.44
1946 0.39 0.30 0.46 0.46 0.46
1947 0.40 0.31 0.48 0.46 0.47
1948 0.40 0.31 0.50 0.46 0.46
1949 0.39 0.28 0.50 0.45 0.46
1950 0.42 0.31 0.50 0.45 0.46
1951 0.43 0.35 0.51 0.50 0.47
1952 0,44 0.35 0.51 0.44 0.47
aEXCIUdOS corporate banks, insurance carriers, and farms.
utilities and transportation combined before 1938.
Source: Statistics of Inc ome, Bureau of Internal Revenue, through 1949;
estimated thereafter from a variety of sources.
the corporate sector.The debt-to-asset relationship for public
utilities rose sharply from 1946 to 1948, and has tended to stabi-
lize since then.In transportation and communication industries, the
ratio has had a sEight downward drift over most of the period. For
trade and miscellaneous industries, the ratio rose sharply just
after Vt'orld SVar II and has fluctuated within a narrow range since
1946.In manufacturing, which accounts for most of the level of
corporate assets and debts outstanding, the ratio was irregularly
downward until 1949, then it increased sharply, and by the end of
1951 returned to the peak reached in the early war years.
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Although corporations a group maintained a relatively high
ratio of current to total assets in the postwar period, the proportion
of current assets held in liquid form (but not the absolute amount
held) has declined sharply from the extraordinary peaks reached at
the end of II (Table 14).Corporate cash and holdings
of marketable securities increased about $10 billion since 1945,
but the rise in other current assets, mainly inventories and re-
ceivables, was much greater.Liquid assets are still a substan-
tially greater proportion of all current assets than in prewar periods.
Liquid assets are also higher in relation to current liabilities than
before the war, although much below the unusual liquidity posi-
tion at the war's end.Of course, higher levels of postwar activ-
ities, higher prices, increased tax liabilities1 and the acceleration
of tax payments under the Mills plan all undoubtedly require that
corporations maintain higher liquid balances than before the war.


















1938$10 $41 0.24 830 0.33
1939 13 51 0.25 31 0.41
1940 15 57 0.26 34 0.44
1941 17 68 0.26 42 0.42
1942 26 78 0.33 48 0.54
1943 35 87 0.40 52 0.67
1944 39 90 0.43 52 0.75
1945 39 89 0.44 46 0.86
1946 35 101 0.35 52 0.69
1947 37 116 0.31 61 0.60
1948 39 127 0.31 64 0.61
1949 42 127 0.33 60 0.70
1950 46 149 0.31 77 0.60
1951 49 163 0.30 91 0.54
1952 50 173 0.29 97 0.51
alncludes all corporations except banks and companies, insurance
carriers, and agriculture.
bCash and marketable securities.
Source: Statistics of Income, Bureau of Internal Revenue, and Securities
and Exchange Commission.
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liquidity squeeze that (apart from adverse income developments)
would threaten expansion programs.
Wihile debt rose faster than assets throughout most of the postwar
period, the relationship of debt to income has been more erratic.
When the Korean War began, the ratio increased sharply (Table 15).
For all corporations combined, the ratio of debt to income in 1952
was twice that in 1950, and a third above the relationship in 1946.
As in other aspects of postwar corporate financing, industrial
differences are marked.For most of the postwar period, the ratio of
debt to income24 in manufacturing industries was lower than in the
1920's or 193O's, but the drop in income in 1952 brought the ratio
above prewar levels,in contrast, the debt-to-income ratio for the
electric, water, and gas utility group rose more gradually in the
postwar period, and at the end of 1952 was only about one-sixth
above prewar levels. Debts of the communication and transportation
group and the trade group were well below the 1939 relationship to
income (Table 15).
The increase in debt has resulted in a substantial rise in aggre-
gate corporate interest payments, but these payments are still a
much lower percentage of income than in prewar periods.The
effective interest rate (interest paid as a percentage of debt out-
standing), in postwar years has been about half of the rate in the
1920's.Current interest rates on new borrowing, despite recent
advances, are still below those of the 1920's, and furthermore the
recent advanced rates have not yet permeated the entire debt out-
standing.For the postwar period as a whole, interest payments
have been earned on the average nearly eight times, as compared
with an average of 4.5 times in immediate prewar years and less
than twice in most of the 1930's.The burden of these payments is
further reduced if considered in conjunction with the higher current
level of tax rates.
Not much is known about the maturity distribution or amortization
schedule of corporate debt.The rising proportion of current to
total liabilities has increased the amount that would exert an imme-
diate pressure on corporate funds in the event of a widespread
downturn in the economy.It is also possible that more of the long-
term debt would be an immediate claim on these funds,, for much of
the postwar increase in debt has been through private placements
24PJl comparisons are between corporate debt, including current tax
liabilities, and corporate profits before deducting tax liabilities on cur-
rent year's income, before payment of current interest or dividends but
after payment of taxes on prior years' incomes. This is an approximation






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.FINANCING OF CAPITAL FORMATION
and a large share of these require regular amortization.However,
until more is known about the maturity schedule of these debts, it is
impossible to estimate the change in principal repayment load.
information on debt amortization requirements and data on
individualunitsto permit cross-classification between balance
sheet positions and expenditures, such as are available to a lim-
ited extent in the consumer area, it is difficult to generalize about
theeffects oncapital outlays of postwar corporate financing.
Obviously the special stimulito expansion given by unusually
favorable balance sheet structures and low fixed charges for debt
service have been partly used up.On the other hand the current
situation, as pictured in the aggregate statistics, does not indicate
that present financial relationships (at present income rates) would
put particular limits on other factors tending to sustain expansion
rates.
State and Local Governments
As noted in the earlier discussion of financing patterns of states
and local governments, the excess of borrowing over capital outlays
permitted these units (in the aggregate) to add substantially to their
liquid asset holdings since the war.In fact local governments are
unique in that their liquidity (liquid-asset-to-debt ratio) is almost
as high as it was at the end of the war.
For governmental units, liquidity ratios are far less significant
than the elements of the ratio considered separately—the amount of
debt outstanding relative to constitutional debt limits, the costs of
servicing debt relative to revenues, and the size of asset reserves
relative to the magnitude of projected expenditure programs.
Partial information on these factors is available.Local govern-
ment debt outstanding is now over 7 times net revenues (gross re-
ceipts less current operating expenditures) as compared with less
than 6 times revenues at the end of the war, but over 15 times
revenues in the late 1930's.Changes in debt amortization sched-
ules are not known, but statistics on interest indicate that the
interest component of debt service is far less of a drain on revenues
than before the war. Interest payments now take less than one-sixth
of revenues available for debt service (net revenues before interest
payments as compared with two-fifths before the war.Similar
changes have occurred in the relation of debt and interest to the net
revenues of state governments. These comparisons suggest that at
present levels of tax and other receipts, neither liquidity positions
nor debt-carrying costs would bar maintenance or expansion of capi-
tat outlay rates.
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Constitutionaldebt limits may prove a more serious problem
(studies on the relation of debt limits to debt outstanding have not
been completed). The growing popularity of revenue bonds—issues
primarily secured by the income from operation of specific facili-
ties rather than the general revenues of the governmental unit—may
indicate pressure to circumvent these restrictions on the borrowing
capacity of municipalities and states. Of the $21 billion of security
issues by state and local governments since the end of the war,
$4.5 billion have been revenue and other limited obligation bonds.
Apparently about half of these have been issued by state govern-
mental authorities.Aggregate data on security issues do not dis-
tinguish state issues from those of local authorities, but this can
be inferred from other information.At mid-1945 not fully guaranteed
debt outstanding—not strictly synonymous with revenue issues, but
roughly comparable—amounted to about $300 million, or 13 per cent
of total state long-term debt.By mid-1952 the amount owed in-
creased to $1.8 billion, and the proportion to 27 per cent. Over this
period local nonguaranteed debt increased from $1.8 billion to $3.2
billions, or from 13 per cent of long-term local debt in 1945 to 15
per cent in 1952.
The high rate of economic activity in postwar years enabled many
ofthe projectsfinanced by revenue bonds to earn substantial
profits, and this successful showing encouraged other governmental
units to use the same financing technique, although interest rates
on these nonguaranteed issues tended to be higher than those
backed by the "full faith and credit" of the sponsoring government.
3. Conclusion
We have emphasized the wide diversity of financing patterns in
the postwar economy and the need for more data on the subject,
presumably to uncover even more diversity.It would be self-defeat-
ing,. therefore, to attempt sweeping conclusions. To the extent that
the data warrant, some inferences as to the significance of postwar
financial developments on capital formation were drawn in the ac-
count of developments for each major sector.
If there is a common thread to the experience of these groups, it
is probably their continued credit-worthiness despite the large
volume of debt already incurred.For almost all of the groups con-
sidered, liquidity is down and fixed charges on incomes are up as
compared with the early postwar situation.Yet neither the aggre-
gates nor the distributive data available indicate that the financing
todatehasseriouslyimpairedabilitytocontinue financing
184FINANCING OF CAPITAL FORMATION
capital outlays so long as high levels of activity are maintained
throughout most of the economy.
The qualification isallimportant.Present aniortization and
interest charges can rapidly become onerous if incomes decline,
and higher levels of liquidity soon become an objective when
prices begin to slip.25In a downturn these financial relationships
may becomeincreasinglyimportantdeterminantsofbehavior,
cumulating the downward pressures as defaults mount, stimulating
expansion in cash accounts rather than plant accounts.
COMMENT
IRWIN FRIEND, University of Pennsylvania
Daniel H. Brill's paper presents in convenient form a wide variety
of data relating to the financing of capital formation by consumers,
businesses, and state and local governments, both in the postwar
and prewar periods, and analyzes the effect of postwar develop-
ments on the financial position of these groups and on the pros-
pects for maintenance of high capital formation.I do not plan to
discuss the data presented, except incidentally, since where they
are not taken from published materials they cannot be appraised on
the basis of information contained in the paper.
Iwould likefirstto consider Brill's general conclusion and
second to comment on a number of specific points in his analysis.
In his conclusion, Brill states that ".,.neitherthe aggregates nor
the distributive data available indicate that the financing to date
has seriously impaired ability to continue financing capital out-
lays so long as high levels of activity are maintained throughout
most of the economy.The qualification is all important.Present
amortization and interest charges can rapidly become onerous if
incomes decline.. ..."Itseems to me that the qualification is
almost tautological. however, is the significance of the
statement that postwar developments in the financial position of the
various groups have not seriously impaired their ability to continue
financing capital outlays? To be meaningful, it might imply that the
economic units involved will not want, in aggregate, to cut down on
their present rate of capital expenditures because of their reaction
21Friend'scontention that this qualification is tautological fails tO'
distinguish between a situation of stable or rising incomes, in which
the debt burden might still grow with sufficient rapidity so as to become
onerous,and one in which present debt-income relationships become
onerous only if incomes decline.
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to deterioration in financial position over the postwar period and
that the suppliers of funds will also not be adversely affected to
any appreciable extent by these financial developments.
Now it is reasonably clear that other things remaining equal, as
the debt burden rises, there is less room for further increases to
bolster expenditures and the economy is more vulnerable to a down-
turn.what Brill in effect does, in assessing the burden of existing
debt, is what most of us do.Vie look at a couple of key balance
sheet and income account ratios and decide whether they are or are
not excessive both in the light of preconceptions about appropriate
levels, but more importantly in historical perspective.Brill finds,
as do various other Department of Commerce and Federal Reserve
studies, that the debt burden is higher currently than at the end of
'World 'War II but that it is not too high in comparison with prior
periods.Thus, for corporations, it is well known that the various
liquidity ratios are not now too different from the prewar period and
that interest payments are a much smaller proportion of income
before taxes than in the 1920's, indicating a relatively favorable
debt burden.Brill points out, on the other hand, that the current
relationship of corporate debt to book assets is the highest for the
period covered (since 1926), which to the extent that this relation-
ship is meaningful suggest a worsening in the debt position.For
individuals, he presents data only on the relative amounts of con-
sumers' payments for debt service and certain other "contractual
obligations" in the period from 1939 on, suggesting that in rela-
tion to income, consumer debt is about as high now as in the im-
mediate prewar period. does not present corresponding data
for the 1920's, nor does he make use of liquidity measures or other
balance sheet ratios for any of the years covered.
Assuming that the findings he presents plus other data which
might be adduced imply that the burden of the debt for each of the
private sectors in the economy as measured by some composite of
financial ratios is no greater now than in prior periods of boom,
what does this prove in terms of Brill's general conclusion quoted
earlier?Perhaps expansion in previous boom periods used as a
basis of comparison, e.g. the late 1920's, was limited by the finan-
cial condition of consumers and firms.Perhaps the expenditure
decisions of consumers and firms are more influenced by a com-
parison of their current position with ratios of recent years than
with ratios in the l92O's and 193O's.Actually to substantiate the
kind of conclusion quoted it seems to me that we must depart from
Brill's basic framework of reference and, from other types of data,
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assess the effect of changes in financial position on the demand
for and supply of funds. This can be done to some extent by direct
surveys of samples of the economic units involved.
Brill does point out on the basis of recent survey data that, as we
might have guessed, whether a consumer now possesses capital
goods is likely to be more important than financial ratios in deter.
mining the demand for capital goods.This of course does not
tell us the nature of the relationship between these financial ratios
and demand and does not indicate the effect of changes in these
ratios on the supply of funds.
I have probably belabored my doubts as to the usefulness of
Brill's framework of analysis to the conclusion drawn in the final
section (as well as elsewhere) in his paper.I think this type of
analysis is a desirable starting point for assessing the possible
impact of trends in financial position on the course of economic
activity, but that it does not go very far in this direction.
Ishall devote the rest of my comments to specific points in
Brill's paper, considering them in the order in which they appear
and paying particular attention to material or inferences which are
either presented for the first time or depart somewhat from similar
discussions or analyses which have appeared elsewhere.One
interesting point I would have liked to have seen expanded was
further exploration of the ratio of consumer net borrowing to pur-
chases of homes and other durable goods, which reached a record
rate in the postwar period.To some extent this high ratio simply
reflected the dearth of. expenditures on such goods in the 1930's
and the World War II period so that repayments were relatively low,
•though they have been increasing rapidly in recent years.It also
reflects the long-term acceptance and growth of installment credit
and, in recent years, the low down payments on certain types of
homes backed by various types of government guarantees.On the
other hand an important offset to the effect of these trends on the
ratio of borrowing to purchases might exist in the current provisions
for regular amortization of mortgage loans as against the periodic
renewals of earlier years.Since I am not too familiar with the
derivation of the borrowing estimates for earlier years, I wonder to
what extent they miss, either statistically or conceptually, open-
book credit and the extension of mortgage loans by one individual
to another, both of which were relatively much more important in
past periods than they are now.
Another point which might be qualified is the use of cross-
sectional data from the Survey of Consumer Finances to show that
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most consumers buying durable goods did not have sufficient liquid
assets to defray the debts incurred.This inference seems quite
plausible onthe basis of generalconsiderations and the data
presented, though it would have been desirable to show the debt as
well as liquid assets for consumers classified by debt status.
However, I think it should at least be noted that the aggregate liq-
uid assets estimates obtained from the Survey of Consumer Finances
are very much lower than more reliable totals indicated by external
data.I hasten to add that the median estimates used by Brill
would probably not be affected to the same extent and that the
margin of error is not likely to be sufficient to affect his analysis
too seriously.
The only other part of the paper's discussion of changes in the
financial patterns and position of consumers on whichI shall
comment isthe absence of an attempt to compare roughly the
burdenofcarryingcharges ondebt(including amortization or
repayment) in recent years and in the 1920's.Brill notes that the
current ratio of these charges including closely related contractual
obligations to disposable income has increased rapidly in recent
years and "is almost as large as in 1939." this is sup-
posed to be large or not is difficult to say.I have the impression,
unsupported by figures, that for the average occupant of a home,
including both owners and renters, 'the necessity of meeting fixed
charges would not be more onerous currently in relation to dis-
posable income than in the l92O's and 1930's generally.This
would not be true for shorter-term consumer installment debt.It may
also be relevant to point out that one major form of debt in the
1920's—on securities—is negligible today.The basic difficuliy,
of course, in adequately analyzing changes in the financial patterns
and condition of consumers is the lack of the type of data on
sources and uses of funds and on their balance sheet position
which is available for corporations both in aggregate and by groups.
In Brill's rather extensive discussion of corporate sources and
uses of funds and financial position, most of the analysis follows
orthodox lines and arrives at familiar conclusions, but I am in-
clined to question the significance of a number of the findings he
presents as well as some of the points of departure from the analy-
sis of others in this field.Thus the observation that gross secu-
rities issues for plant and equipment in the postwar jeriod rep-
resented a much higher ratio than in the immediate prewar years
may be quite miBleading without an explanation that this ratio is
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highly correlated with the volume of economic activity and the find-
ing is almost a necessary consequence of cyclical influences.
Brill's observation that the postwar proportion of debt issues to
total security financing was lower than in the l93O'srequiresa
similar qualification.I agree with a somewhat different evaluation
Drill makes in another section, that the proportion of debt to total
issues was about the same in postwar years as in most of the
1920's except for 1928-1929.However, I disagree that this ratio
"did not vary much among industries."I would like to have seen
the basis for this statement as well as an evaluation of the trends
within industries.For example, railroads, which have for many
decades used a lower proportion of stock issues than other corpo-
rations, were a more important part of over-all security financing
in the 1920's than they have been in recent years; within this
industry group stock issues. have gone from a small to a negligible
proportion of the total of new issues. Knowing the complication of
industrial composition, the margin of error in the data, particularly
in the early period, the problems involved in the use of gross versus
net issues in periods marked by wide differences in the use of
stocks to retire debt as well in refundings generally, the growth of
long-term bank debt as a partial substitute for bond issues, changes
in the relative importance of internal financing, etc.,I feel that
statements made about the over-all trend in debt-to-equity ratios
should be suitably qualified.In analyzing this trend, Brill enu-
merates all the familiar ways in which debt has been stimulated in
recent years but does not explain why the ratio of new debt to
equity has not risen.
In presenting selected financial data for a few major groups of
corporations to illustrate industrial differences, the paper intro-
duces unnecessary confusion by classifying together the lráns-
portation and communication companies.ft should not be too
difficultto present thedata separatelyfor transportation and
communication; but if this could not be done, it might be better to
omit this entire class in any analysis of financial characteristics
by industry.Thus Brill makes a number of misleading statements
implying that transportation and communication companies have a
financing pattern closely akin to electric and gas utilities.For
example he states: "The transportation and communication group
also paid out a larger than average share of their profits in the form
of dividends. ..."Whatactually happened, I suspect, is that the
telephone system paid out virtually all their reported profits in the
form of dividends while railroads distributed a smaller than average
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proportion of profits.Incidentally I think that Brill overlooks or
understates the usefulness of the vast amount of sample financial
data available on corporations when he seems to imply that useful
generalizations on financing of investment by size and other charac-
teristics of corporations cannot be made except for industry groups.
Finallyit may be appropriate to add to Brill's discussion of
trends in the relation of corporate debt to assets, which he notes is
now the "highest for the twenty-three-year period examined," that
the present book value of assets is much more understated in cur-
rent dollars than it was in the 1920's as a result of rising capital
goods costs not reflected in book value, the effects of accelerated
depreciation, and less important, the influence of LIFO.If an
adjustment were introduced for these factors, the current ratio of
debt to assets might well be below the prewar proportions.More-
over the effect of changes in the degree of consolidation of corpo-
ration reports as reported to the Bureau of Internal Revenue may,
even for the manufacturing group, so affect this ratio over time as
to make the indicated changes not too impressive.It seems to me
that the only way in which meaningful results of this type can be
obtainedisto work with samples of company reports, though I
would not be inclined to expend much effort on this particular ratio.
MoliRIs MENDELSON, The Pennsylvania State University
Daniel11.Brill's paper is both interesting and enlightening.
Although certain difficulties arise, our different points of view may
be more apparent than real.At one point Brill states that "Iden-
tification of specific sources with specific uses of funds is always
hazardous."This seems to imply that such an identification is at
least conceptually possible.This is misleading.While it is true
thatin some instances such identification is possible, and that
there are sometimes statistical difficulties in making such identifi-
cation,at other times the difficulties are basically conceptual.
One may venture to say that these difficulties are closely related
to the problem of timing.
For example consider the case of a large corporation about to
expand its productive facilities.Let us assume that the corpo-
ration starts with a cash balance of $2 million and plans to issue
$10 million worth of securities.Although it feels that it will
encounter an unfavorable market for the type of securities that it is
willing to offer, it also feels that the market will improve. Because
it wants to proceed with construction, it decides to utilize the cash
balance to carry it over until the time when the market will be more
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favorable.Before the cash balance is exhausted, the securities are
marketed and the proceeds deposited along with whatever has been
left of the original cash balance.The construction continues.
it is true that the corporation may have specified to the SEC
that this particular project was to be financed with the $10 million
issue,is this actually true?If the corporation retains a cash
balance of $2 million when the construction is completed, was the
$10 million project financed by the security issue or by $2 million
of cash balance plus $8 million of the proceeds from the sale of the
securities?Conceptually neither iscorrect, and unfortunately
perhaps this is not just quibbling.
Let us suppose that the construction began in the second quarter
of the year and the securities were issued in the third quarter.
Although the sources-and-uses-of-fundsstatement for the second
quarter will indicate that the project was financed by drawing down
the cash balance, the annual statement covering this period will
show inconsistently that the same construction was financed by the
issue of securities.
This is not to deny the validity of arguing, as Brill does, that in
a given time period there were specific sources and uses of funds.
The objection raised here is to the tying together of specific com-
ponents from the two sides of the table.The danger of thinking in
such terms is that one may get a distorted picture of the economy
which in turn may lee.d to serious errors.
Although Brill could hardly have done otherwise within the scope
of his paper, it is regrettable that certain side issues were not
pursued further.His paper is pregnant with significant implications
for economic theory.First he notes: "Patterns of financing... .have
with respect to the economic group doing the financing and
the type of capital formation being financed. ..." Thisimplies that
it is quite possible for a given volume and composition of capital
formationto be financed in a number of different ways.Each
pattern of financing would presumably be associated with a different
structure of the interest rates.The damage this does to the Key-
nesian concept of the marginal efficiency of investment function is
obviously great.Furthermore it adds credence to the proposition that
interest rates help determine not so much the quantity of capital
formation but rather the type and timing of financing.Again it
raises the question of the relationship between the pattern of
redistribution of currency and deposits that result from ordinary
moneyflows and the structure of interest rates.There is the pos-
sibility that the financial market is not as homogeneous as interest
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theory seems to imply.If this is so, the whole area calls for
serious reconsideration.
Lastly, the relationship between the structure of families and
their willingness to buy durable goods and to incur debts is clearly
brought out in Brill's paper.This has significant implications in
the study of the life cycle of consumer expenditures and calls for
further investigation.
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